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Original article: https://theconversation.com/germanys-new-government-wants-to-be-a-foreign-policy-power-256190
When the CDU/CSU and the SPD sealed their coalition agreement to form the next German government, the would-be chancellor Friedrich Merz proudly announced: “Germany is back on track”. Against a backdrop of considerable geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges, the partners wanted to send clear signal not only to the German public, but also to the European and international partners. After three years of intense government infighting, a new, stable administration was in charge in Germany.
However, a very different message was ultimately sent when a routine vote to confirm Merz as chancellor became an unprecedented fiasco.
Merz failed to gain enough support to be confirmed as chancellor, having lost votes from his own coalition. Merz did manage to secure the parliament’s nomination in a second round of voting, but there is now plenty of gossiping about who was responsible for this disaster. Who in his coalition was taking “revenge” by voting against him in this secret ballot – and on what grounds?
Merz will have to work to move beyond this early blow to his authority and implications in the domestic and international arena. His first action was to embark on a multi-capital tour to meet his fellow European leaders. This is a strong sign of his intentions as chancellor – to look outward, emphasising foreign policy.
Prioritising defence and consolidating power
For a long time, continuity has prevailed when it comes to Germany’s policy towards Europe. However, relations with neighbours are currently undergoing a period of transition due to a changing international environment. A big step came under former social democratic chancellor Olaf Scholz, who overturned post-war policy by announcing a €100 million investment in the military in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Merz now wants Germany to become a “leading medium-size power”. The coalition agreement signed between Merz’s CDU/CSU and the social democratic SPD, grants the chancellor a stronger role in order to achieve this aim.
The 144-page document, entitled “Responsibility for Germany” (Verantwortung für Deutschland), prioritises defence, deterrence and strengthening resilience — in military, economic, political and social terms.
EU partners expect leadership from the new German government and a stronger commitment from Merz in particular, because of his first-hand experience as a member of the European Parliament from 1989 to 1994. Merz is certainly committed to European integration and to the EU, which is mentioned in the coalition agreement as “a guarantor of freedom, peace, security and prosperity”.
The coalition agreement emphasises closing ranks with the European partners. Merz cemented this commitment by visiting Paris and Warsaw the day after taking office to announce a reboot of the “Weimar triangle” – a regional allegiance between France, Germany and Poland created in 1991 – as a commitment to what he sees as Germany’s two most important European partners.
There are strong elements of continuity between this government’s approach to Europe and that of its predecessor. There remains an unwavering commitment to the EU and NATO and comprehensive support for Ukraine. What is, however, new, is the strong emphasis on defence in the coalition agreement.
“We want to be able to defend ourselves, so that we don’t have to defend ourselves,” the document states.
With this in mind, a long-held conservative ambition is being realised — the creation of a national security council (Bundessicherheitsrat) within the federal chancellery. This gives the chancellor a stronger role in foreign policy.
In addition, the new minister for foreign affairs, Johann Wadephul, is a Merz loyalist from the CDU. Traditionally, this was a role held by the junior coalition partner. This new situation, in which the chancellor and minister for foreign affairs are from the same party, plus the new national security council, means that power is concentrated in the chancellery.
Further afield
Beyond the immediate neighbourhood, positioning Germany towards the US, China and Israel are high on the agenda. In line with the German “Staatsräson” – an element of foreign policy that recognises Israel’s right to exist and sees Israeli security as a German national interest.
Merz announced in February 2025 that he is willing to find “means and ways” to welcome the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Berlin. This despite the the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant against him. Such a visit would be a breach with the strong German tradition of rule of law and the respect for multilateral institutions.
Merz is also known to be a transatlanticist and his camp had already reached out to the US administration before taking office. Tariff wars are detrimental to the German economy given the strong dependence on exports to the US. It is similar for China, another important trading partner, but also a “systemic rival” which requires a sound “de-risking” strategy.
Yet, given the destructive Trump presidency and the insecurity when it comes to the US commitment to European security, a policy towards the US will be paramount. Strengthening relations with the UK in cooperation with the EU partners is meant to go some way to balancing the lack of US support, especially in relation to Ukraine.
Merz appears willing to take up these challenges and to focus his chancellorship on EU and foreign policy. It helps that the conservative European People’s Party (of which the CDU/CSU is a member) currently dominates the European Parliament and that the powerful position of European Commission president is currently held by a German, in the form of Ursula von der Leyen.
Yet the ballot fiasco in the national parliament shows that Merz is more vulnerable at home than he would like to be. This may end up frustrating his ambition to lead change in Europe.
Merz also still needs to win the trust of ordinary Germans, too. He is not a popular chancellor. Less than 40% Germans have trust in him and women especially dislike his style. In addition to efficient policymaking, he will need to improve on his pointed and polarising communicative style if he is to reach out to the people.
Gabriele Abels is a member of the Europa-Union Deutschland which belongs to the Union of European Federalists.