Gaza: what ceasefire negotiations tell us about how each side judges its progress in the war

In all conflicts, the period preceding a ceasefire agreement is the most dangerous, as each side tries to gain the best military position before the fighting ends. The long, drawn out negotiations aimed at bringing a halt to the war in Gaza are no exception.

Hamas has renewed missile attacks on Israel and Israeli forces have been undertaking operations in Rafah, which Israel has portrayed as the last Hamas stronghold, and in Jabalia in northern Gaza. The ceasefire talks hosted in Cairo have in turn been buffeted by events on the ground.

The way Israel and Hamas judge their progress in the war tells us a lot about the prospects for the talks.

The past week has demonstrated that the war is not going well for Israel. Four months ago, Israel announced that it had “dismantled” Hamas battalions in northern Gaza. Now, its troops are back battling Hamas once more, not only in Jabalia but in several other places near Gaza City.

This underlines Israel’s failure to achieve a “total victory” over Hamas and highlights the weakness of the intelligence on which its battle plans have been based. It is evident that Israeli intelligence underestimated the extent and sophistication of the tunnels beneath Gaza and the tactical flexibility of Hamas.

Yet the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, frequently claims that Israel is on the road to victory. This colours his attitude towards the ceasefire negotiations – that there will be no permanent ceasefire, and the war on Gaza will continue.

Palestinians remove debris following an Israeli air strike in Al Nuseirat refugee camp, central Gaza Strip, on May 14 2024.
Mohammed Saber/EPA

On the other side, the war has been a propaganda triumph for Hamas. Pictures of the terrible suffering of the Palestinian people have been beamed across of the world.

Hamas also demonstrated its deft publicity skills when it announced that it had accepted a ceasefire agreement brokered by Egypt on May 6. In reality, Hamas had only accepted the framework and had made counter proposals on the critical details such as the release of Israeli hostages. Nonetheless, the message that Hamas had accepted the agreement became a news headline.

Read more:
Gaza war: success of Egypt’s peace deal would set blueprint for future of Middle East – expert Q&A

Despite the atrocities of October 7, Hamas delegations are welcome in Russia, Iran, Turkey and South Africa. And it appears to see the demonstrations and student protests across Europe and North America as weakening western resolve to support Israel. There is reason to believe that Hamas, rather cynically, thinks the war is going well, at least politically.

The group claims the war has brought the Palestine question to public attention around the world. Its attitude towards a ceasefire needs to be seen in this light. Hamas has made it clear that it only wants a ceasefire on its terms – one that would effectively mean it remaining in power in some form in Gaza.

A deal is still far off

Despite these factors, the negotiations continue. Assessing their progress is very difficult given the many layers of decision-making involved. The political leaderships are speaking through official teams of negotiators and the intelligence services of Qatar, Egypt, the US and Israel.

Hamas is divided between its internal leadership in Gaza and external leadership in Qatar. The group’s Qatar-based political leader, Ismael Haniyeh, is senior in the hierarchy, but its leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, also occupies a critical position.

They are not political rivals. But whereas Sinwar is on the ground – or more likely in his tunnel – Haniyeh is more exposed to international diplomacy. It also often takes around 48 hours for messages to be passed back and forth between the two.

In Israel, there is a sharp divide between those whose priority is crushing Hamas and those who prioritise the release of the hostages. The 132 remaining hostages have spent well over 200 days in captivity and daily demonstrations aim to pressure the government to reach a deal to bring them home. It is already too late for many who have died and the fear is that many more will succumb to the terrible conditions in which they are kept.

However, far-right members of Netenyahu’s coalition have all but rejected a ceasefire, while more moderate members want one. This has led to tensions with the opposition National Union party that is part of the emergency war cabinet.

People attend a protest in Tel Aviv, Israel, calling for the release of hostages held by Hamas in Gaza, on May 11 2024.
Atef Safadi / EPA

Hanging over the ceasefire negotiations is the question of what comes next for Gaza after the war. The current framework under discussion in Cairo is a 42-day ceasefire deal, with a discussion over a more permanent cessation of hostilities referred to as “sustainable calm”.

The Israeli government has no realistic plan for the “day after” other than an Israel military presence and some unspecified Palestinian civil administration. In other words, a return to the situation before the war but with an Israeli military occupation of Gaza. This is a recipe for recreating the conditions that led to the October 7 massacres. It would bring neither security to Israel nor peace for the Palestinians.

One of Israel’s former prime ministers, Ehud Olmert, has argued it is in Israel’s interests to set a new agenda for Israelis and Palestinians. For him, the Israeli hostages should be returned in exchange for an end to the war.

That should be followed with Israel withdrawing from the Gaza strip and being replaced by an international peacekeeping force that is preferably Arab-led. And in the longer-term, concrete steps must be taken towards establishing a Palestinian state.

Olmert understands that politics must determine military action. Unfortunately, the Israeli government and Hamas want military action to shape their politics. This is not to say there will not be a ceasefire in Gaza, but it does not bode well for future peace in the Middle East. Läs mer…

Gaza war: success of Egypt’s peace deal would set blueprint for future of Middle East – expert Q&A

In the diplomatic manoeuvrings surrounding the conflict in Gaza, things are beginning to gather pace. Israel’s western allies are pressing the Israeli prime minister to accept the latest plan brokered by Egypt and Qatar, while the Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, are similarly exerting pressure on Hamas to soften its position. But Russia and China are hosting talks in Beijing between Hamas and Fatah which could destabilise everything. We talked with John Strawson, Middle East expert at the University of East London, who has been researching and publishing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for several decades, who believes the crisis has reached a critical moment.

Egypt has brokered a new deal which the Hamas leadership has said it will consider. The UK foreign minister says it’s a “very generous offer”. What’s new about this and what are the push and pull factors that might persuade Hamas to accept the terms?

The proposals that have been made in Cairo and guaranteed by Egypt, Qatar and the US are significantly new. The most remarkable feature is that over the course of a 40-day cessation of hostilities, Israel will; in phased manner, suspend military operations, withdraw its forces, and allow civilians to return to their homes. It also provides for talks to lead to a prolonged ceasefire and rebuilding of Gaza.

Under the plan Hamas will initially release 33 Israeli hostages in exchange for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. In the longer term it envisages the return of all hostages and the continued release of Palestinian prisoners and detainees. Hamas, it is reported, wants to add a requirement that Israel commit to never returning to Gaza. But the Israelis would not agree to that under current conditions.

However, it’s difficult to know how serious Hamas is given it has already achieved many of its demands, particularly on the return of civilians to their, albeit shattered, homes and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from many parts of Gaza.

The signals are that Hamas, having wrung concessions from the Israelis, will drag out the talks hoping for more. Palestinian civilians must be hoping that it accepts the arrangements so they can begin to pick up their lives again.

Israel has sent a delegation to Cairo and is under great domestic pressure to agree any deal that leads to the hostages returning home. We could be tantalisingly near to the end of the war. However, that will depend ultimately on how Hamas’s Yahya Sinwar and Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, respond.

Meanwhile the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, has been in Saudi Arabia this week talking with Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, as well as representatives of five other Gulf countries. While Gaza is clearly at the centre of their discussions, is there a bigger picture involved here?

US president Joe Biden and his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, have been working assiduously on creating a new security architecture for the Middle East for some time. Ironically the Iranian attack on Israel on April 13 has given the administration the opportunity to take this forward.

The coordination between the US, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and some Gulf states in resisting the Iranians showcased the benefits of such an alliance. Saudi Arabia is now key in the US plan for a post-Gaza war Middle East. The Saudis have made it clear over the past week that recognition of Israel is now only a matter of timing. The conditions must include Israeli steps towards Palestinian statehood. If Netanyahu resists this, the Saudis are likely to press the US for a technology and security deal in any event.

Talks: US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, with German foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, in Riyadh with Saudi foreign minister, Prince Prince Faisal bin Farhan.
dpa picture alliance / Alamy Stock Photo

Blinken and the Saudis are actively discussing an Arab-led peacekeeping force to replace the Israelis in Gaza. That would offer a move in the direction of statehood. Netanyahu desperately wants Saudi recognition, and it may be the leverage that might bring this about.

The US has made it very clear to Netanyahu, that Israel’s plan to launch an assault on Gaza is not acceptable. Short of sanctioning the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and cutting arms sales, which Washington has said it will not do, what other pressure can be brought to bear on the Israeli war cabinet?

Netanyahu has been talking about the Rafah operation for months but only now have the IDF assembled the troops needed for the assault. It may also be that the concession to Hamas on civilians returning to their homes is in part an attempt to see a movement of civilians from Rafah to make an operation easier.

The far right in the Israeli cabinet insists on the Rafah operation for their continued support for Netanyahu. The US are trying to counter that, and I suspect that Blinken will be bringing great political pressure on the Israeli prime minister to stay his hand.

He will also know that the war cabinet is divided over the priority that the Rafah operation has compared to the necessity of returning the hostages. Blinken will be trying to use that divide to at least delay any operation so that the current ceasefire negotiations can be successful.

At this stage I suspect the US will be using these political pressures rather than the threat of halting arms sales.

Netanyahu clearly has problems of his own, with the right-wing of his fractious coalition refusing to countenance a ceasefire deal with Hamas. If he needed to, could he cobble together enough support in the Knesset to do without them? Are there signs that he is talking to other parties and factions?

Netanyahu is more known for his political cunning than his political courage. But it’s not just a question of the far right holding Netanyahu to ransom. That’s because some of his own Likud party, both in the government and the Knesset, hold similar views – such as the diaspora minister, Amichai Chickli.

Netanyahu would fear that any search for new coalition partners would destabilise his position and increase pressure for new elections.

The big question is whether the opposition members of the war cabinet, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, from the National Unity party will remain in the cabinet if the ceasefire agreement is rejected will be critical to whether it can continue to operate. Eisenkot, who attends the war cabinet member as an observer, has publicly denounced the far-right’s attempt to derail it.

Pressure: US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, meeting the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.
EPA-EFE/Haim Tzach/GPO handout

If Hamas does eventually agree to the deal, Netanyahu will have to make a decision that will have fateful consequences for the lives of Israeli hostages and Palestinian civilians. Many fear, however that his calculations could focus more on his own political future than anything else.

That said, Netanyahu may feel that with the US moves on regional security and the prospect of Saudi recognition it could be the smart thing to do.

Any lasting peace will depend on both sides recognising the other’s right to exist, so that a two-state solution with security guarantees on both sides can eventually be achieved. Is there a sense that we are any closer to this?

The challenges to the two-state solution were on display when the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, spoke at the Riyadh security conference on April 27. Abbas talked about an Israeli occupation for 75 years and called for the formation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.

Abbas’s position seems curious given that he has previously said that the Arab rejection of the 1947 partition plan for a two-state solution has been a “mistake”. But it could be that the reference to 75 years of occupation was a gesture towards Hamas, given the current talks in Beijing, sponsored by Russia and China, to reconcile the differences between Fatah and Hamas and create a unified national movement.

Abbas, like Netanyahu, is thus looking over his shoulder at his extremists. The inclusion of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority would destroy any moves by Israel towards a two-state solution. Since October 7 there is a clear political consensus in Israel that Hamas can have no role in Palestinian politics.

But there have been many attempts to bring the PLO and Hamas together in the past and they have all failed and the likelihood of success now is slim.

Saudi moves towards recognition of Israel will also have an impact on Abbas. Saudi leaders will not be impressed with a rapprochement with Hamas, given its origins in the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation banned in the kingdom.

Blinken’s current mission to the region is based on trying to reshape the Middle East by creating the basis for political, economic and security cooperation between Israel and the main Sunni Arab states. Ending the Gaza war in a way that advances this aim is the challenge. In that context the current ceasefire negotiations are crucial. However, while Blinken offers a glimpse of a new Middle East, Netanyahu and Sinwar are far too comfortable in the old one. Läs mer…