Författare: Stefan Wolff Professor of International Security University

It took months of delays and desperate pleas from Ukraine, but the US House of Representatives has finally passed a bill authorising US$60 billion (£50 billion) worth of military aid to Ukraine.

The bill is still subject to Senate approval and then needs to be signed into law by the US president, Joe Biden. But given the Senate’s previous approval of a similar measure and Biden’s vehemence of the need to support Ukraine, this should be a formality.

So, will US support save Ukraine from what might otherwise have been an all-but-certain defeat? The answer is not straightforward. What is certain is that it gives Ukraine a breathing space on the battlefield – and an opportunity to halt a slow but steady Russian offensive that has netted Moscow substantial territorial gains in recent months.

Apart from Senate and presidential approval, there are still some logistical difficulties to overcome. Most of the urgently needed military hardware, especially ammunition, is already stored in Poland. But it needs to be transported to the frontlines and incorporated into defence strategy and tactics by Ukrainian troops there.

But, given that they are now secure in the knowledge that supplies arrive soon, Kyiv will be less compelled to ration ammunition as it has been forced to do recently. Together with the morale boost for troops, this means that improvements in the situation on the front are likely – even before new US supplies will arrive.

Political will

How much more than a reprieve will this aid package really provide? This depends on several factors. The sustainability of military and other forms of aid is not simply a financial question. It is above all one of political will.

The months-long delay in the US Congress was primarily an issue of domestic political posturing in a presidential election year. After a series of mixed signals over recent months, Donald Trump backed Republican House speaker Mike Johnson in his decision to bring the Ukraine aid bill to a vote on Saturday. But more Republican members of the House opposed the bill than supported it.

Moreover, if Trump were to return to the White House after November’s election, his personal grudges against Ukraine and its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, are well known. This – as well as his past expressions of admiration for Vladimir Putin – make him, and the US, an uncertain long-term ally.

Earlier difficulties in the EU to pass its multi-annual Ukraine support package were caused by the pro-Russian leanings of just one among its 27 heads of state and government. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán now seems to have found a like-minded ally in Slovakia’s prime minister, Robert Fico, who has opposed efforts to provide more military aid to Ukraine, instead arguing that Kyiv should seek a negotiated settlement with Moscow.

European parliamentary elections in June are likely to return a larger proportion of pro-Russian members to the parliament who are opposed to open-ended support for Ukraine. While their influence on funding decisions is much more limited, they could certainly create significant problems in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations.

Economic capacity

To add to that, the US and Europe’s defence industrial bases are nowhere near sufficiently geared up to match Russia’s vastly increased military output and its own strengthened defence sector. Russia’s rapid transition to a war economy has been additionally buoyed by Iranian, North Korean and Chinese support and weapons supplies.

There is some confidence that production capacity in the US and Europe, as well as in Ukraine, will significantly increase as of 2025. At the same time there is some doubt whether Russia will be able to sustain its current rate of military output, especially if the US and EU manage to dissuade China and Iran from further aiding Moscow.

But even in an optimistic scenario of sustained investments in the defence industrial base of the collective west and increasing Russian economic and logistical difficulties to sustain its defence sector, a gamechanging shift in the balance of power is unlikely in the near future.

Russia holds the initiative, for now

In addition, Russia, at the moment in any case, still has clear manpower advantages. It also enjoys air superiority in light of depleted Ukrainian air defence systems, and has the operational momentum on the battlefield. If anything, Russia will now double down on its current offensive pushes.

Battlefield advantage: Russian president, Vladimir Putin, with his defence minister, Sergei Shoigu.
EPA-EFE/Gavril Grigorov/Sputnik/Kremlin pool

It will want to press home these advantages before Ukraine’s defences are bolstered by the arrival of military aid, and potentially more US military advisers.

A final point worth reiterating is that Ukraine is not the only major security crisis that the west is facing. At the same time as the US House of Representatives passed its Ukraine support bill, it also voted in favour of military support for Israel and Taiwan, potentially authorising a combined total of some US$100 billion (£81 billion). In light of an existing $34 trillion federal debt balance – which increases by US$1 trillion every 100 days – the long-term sustainability of such aid packages is in question, and not only during a potential second Trump presidency.

Taken together, all this probably means that predictions that Ukraine will win the war against Russia within a year on the back of this additional US support are at best overly optimistic and at worst dangerously delusional. A more realistic assessment would be that the resolve that the west seems to be rediscovering more widely in its support for Ukraine will give Kyiv an opportunity to improve its negotiating position when the two sides finally sit down to bring this war to an end.

But even this could turn out to be wishful thinking. Given the continuing rhetoric of victory in Moscow and Kyiv, another forever-war might just have become more sustainable – for now. Läs mer…

It took months of delays and desperate pleas from Ukraine, but the US House of Representatives has finally passed a bill authorising US$60 billion (£50 billion) worth of military aid to Ukraine.

The bill is still subject to Senate approval and then needs to be signed into law by the US president, Joe Biden. But given the Senate’s previous approval of a similar measure and Biden’s vehemence of the need to support Ukraine, this should be a formality.

So, will US support save Ukraine from what might otherwise have been an all-but-certain defeat? The answer is not straightforward. What is certain is that it gives Ukraine a breathing space on the battlefield – and an opportunity to halt a slow but steady Russian offensive that has netted Moscow substantial territorial gains in recent months.

Apart from Senate and presidential approval, there are still some logistical difficulties to overcome. Most of the urgently needed military hardware, especially ammunition, is already stored in Poland. But it needs to be transported to the frontlines and incorporated into defence strategy and tactics by Ukrainian troops there.

But, given that they are now secure in the knowledge that supplies arrive soon, Kyiv will be less compelled to ration ammunition as it has been forced to do recently. Together with the morale boost for troops, this means that improvements in the situation on the front are likely – even before new US supplies will arrive.

Political will

How much more than a reprieve will this aid package really provide? This depends on several factors. The sustainability of military and other forms of aid is not simply a financial question. It is above all one of political will.

The months-long delay in the US Congress was primarily an issue of domestic political posturing in a presidential election year. After a series of mixed signals over recent months, Donald Trump backed Republican House speaker Mike Johnson in his decision to bring the Ukraine aid bill to a vote on Saturday. But more Republican members of the House opposed the bill than supported it.

Moreover, if Trump were to return to the White House after November’s election, his personal grudges against Ukraine and its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, are well known. This – as well as his past expressions of admiration for Vladimir Putin – make him, and the US, an uncertain long-term ally.

Earlier difficulties in the EU to pass its multi-annual Ukraine support package were caused by the pro-Russian leanings of just one among its 27 heads of state and government. Hungary’s Viktor Orbán now seems to have found a like-minded ally in Slovakia’s prime minister, Robert Fico, who has opposed efforts to provide more military aid to Ukraine, instead arguing that Kyiv should seek a negotiated settlement with Moscow.

European parliamentary elections in June are likely to return a larger proportion of pro-Russian members to the parliament who are opposed to open-ended support for Ukraine. While their influence on funding decisions is much more limited, they could certainly create significant problems in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations.

Economic capacity

To add to that, the US and Europe’s defence industrial bases are nowhere near sufficiently geared up to match Russia’s vastly increased military output and its own strengthened defence sector. Russia’s rapid transition to a war economy has been additionally buoyed by Iranian, North Korean and Chinese support and weapons supplies.

There is some confidence that production capacity in the US and Europe, as well as in Ukraine, will significantly increase as of 2025. At the same time there is some doubt whether Russia will be able to sustain its current rate of military output, especially if the US and EU manage to dissuade China and Iran from further aiding Moscow.

But even in an optimistic scenario of sustained investments in the defence industrial base of the collective west and increasing Russian economic and logistical difficulties to sustain its defence sector, a gamechanging shift in the balance of power is unlikely in the near future.

Russia holds the initiative, for now

In addition, Russia, at the moment in any case, still has clear manpower advantages. It also enjoys air superiority in light of depleted Ukrainian air defence systems, and has the operational momentum on the battlefield. If anything, Russia will now double down on its current offensive pushes.

Battlefield advantage: Russian president, Vladimir Putin, with his defence minister, Sergei Shoigu.
EPA-EFE/Gavril Grigorov/Sputnik/Kremlin pool

It will want to press home these advantages before Ukraine’s defences are bolstered by the arrival of military aid, and potentially more US military advisers.

A final point worth reiterating is that Ukraine is not the only major security crisis that the west is facing. At the same time as the US House of Representatives passed its Ukraine support bill, it also voted in favour of military support for Israel and Taiwan, potentially authorising a combined total of some US$100 billion (£81 billion). In light of an existing US$34 trillion federal debt balance – which increases by US$1 trillion every 100 days – the long-term sustainability of such aid packages is in question, and not only during a potential second Trump presidency.

Taken together, all this probably means that predictions that Ukraine will win the war against Russia within a year on the back of this additional US support are at best overly optimistic and at worst dangerously delusional. A more realistic assessment would be that the resolve that the west seems to be rediscovering more widely in its support for Ukraine will give Kyiv an opportunity to improve its negotiating position when the two sides finally sit down to bring this war to an end.

But even this could turn out to be wishful thinking. Given the continuing rhetoric of victory in Moscow and Kyiv, another forever-war might just have become more sustainable – for now. Läs mer…

There is broad consensus that Chinese foreign policy has become more assertive and more centralised in the decade since Xi Jinping has ascended to the top of China’s leadership. This has also meant that Chinese foreign policy has become more personalised and that Xi’s own diplomatic engagements offer potentially important clues about its direction.

The international order is clearly in flux and a key driver of this change, by its own admission, has been China.

After more than 100 minutes on the phone with US president Joe Biden on April 2 2024, Xi hosted the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, for an official state visit and several hours of talks two weeks later on April 16 2024.

Read more:
Xi and Biden spoke on the phone for 105 minutes: what does this say about their relationship?

The Chinese readout of the meeting between Xi and Scholz provides some interesting insights in how China envisages its relations with a country that is strategically and economically important, but clearly not a rival in a military sense. Xi emphasised “growing risks and challenges” and the need for “major-country cooperation” to achieve “greater stability and certainty”.

China’s president Xi during the opening session of the National People’s Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, in March 2024.
AP Photo/Ng Han Guan/Alamy

The Chinese framing is, of course, self-serving. Not only does China want German companies to invest, it also wants trade to continue without the threat of punitive tariffs or the dangers of derisking (restricting business relationships), let alone decoupling (weakening economic ties).

This is not a message solely directed at Germany, but was expressed in similar terms in Xi’s meeting with US business leaders at the end of the March.

The European dynamic

Engagements with Germany, however, also have a broader European, and especially EU dimension. Germany now has its own moderately hawkish China strategy, aiming to reduce economic reliance on Beijing.

But Berlin is still considered softer than many other EU member states and therefore an important ally for Beijing within the EU and in EU-US deliberations on China policy.

That Germany does not see eye-to-eye with all its partners in the EU when it comes to China and privileges its own national economic interests over geopolitical concerns became once again obvious when Berlin abstained from a vote on the EU’s new human rights supply chain law.

This wasn’t specifically aimed at China. But the law’s intent to hold large companies to account for potentially benefiting from child labour or environmentally damaging production methods, would clearly constrain trade with China.

More importantly, China will also hope that Germany will at least water down potential EU anti-dumping measures aimed at the Chinese automobile, solar and wind industries.

This is particularly important for China’s state-sponsored economic recovery in light of a hardening of the US line on tariffs on Chinese goods. This was brought in by Donald Trump and continued by Biden in response to China’s policy of dumping goods onto EU and US markets.

These economic dynamics are embedded in broader geopolitical debates. From a German and European perspective, the Russian conduct in the war against Ukraine remains a key concern. Cutting through the diplomatic niceties, it is obvious that China, like Germany, would prefer the Ukraine war to end sooner rather than later.

Since issuing its position paper on Ukraine on the eve of the first anniversary of the Russian aggression in February 2023, China has supported negotiations based on freezing the current frontlines with a ceasefire and then negotiating a settlement between Russia and Ukraine.

This is, so far at least, at odds with the general western position, reiterated by the German chancellor in Beijing, that a Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory is an essential pre-condition for sustainable peace.

Scholz and Xi on diplomacy

Notably, both the German and Chinese leaders emphasised their commitment to key principles of the UN charter. These included sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the importance to explore diplomatic ways to end the war.

What is significant is Scholz’s statement that rather than western military support for Ukraine, diplomacy now takes centre-stage.

Beijing has produced a multitude of visions for the so-called new era, such as the Global Security Initiative (set up by China in 2022 with the aim of eliminating the cause of international conflicts) or the Global Development Initiative (a China-led plan to overcome the challenges of the pandemic). These offer a blueprint of a new international order in which China plays a more dominant role, including in Europe.

Read more:
Ukraine: Beijing’s peace initiative offers glimpse at how China plans to win the war

Yet turning these plans into reality is a different matter and China is experiencing a similar degree of uncertainty regarding the endgame of a new international order as the major players in the west – from Washington, to London, Paris, Berlin and Brussels – are.

China’s approach to managing, and shaping, the fluidity of the international system relies predominantly on diplomacy, albeit with a significant coercive streak. This may not always be obvious in the communiques released after high-level meetings with near-peers, such as the US, the EU or key members of the G7, including Germany, the UK or France. But even in these relationships, China has become more vocal about its red lines in a number of areas beyond traditional concerns such as Taiwan or the South China Sea. This was reflected in China’s response to a meeting between US defence secretary LLoyd Austin and China’s Admiral Dong Jun on April 16, in which it suggested the US continued to behave provocatively over Taiwan.

The emphasis on diplomacy serves Chinese interests well. It helps Beijing to sustain its own narrative of resolving problems, especially with its major trade partners in the G7, through cooperation.

The (not so) hidden message that accompanies this diplomatic front, however, is one of growing Chinese economic and military strength and of a leader who is willing to use that strength to defend and push his country’s red lines. Läs mer…

Ukraine is now experiencing a level of existential threat comparable only to the situation immediately after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022. But in contrast to then, improvements are unlikely – at least not soon.

Not only have conditions along the frontline significantly worsened, according to the Ukrainian commander-in-chief, Oleksandr Syrsky, but the very possibility of a Ukrainian defeat is now discussed in public by people like the former commander of the UK’s Joint Forces Command, General Sir Richard Barrons.

Barrons told the BBC on April 13 that Ukraine could lose the war in 2024 “because Ukraine may come to feel it can’t win … And when it gets to that point, why will people want to fight and die any longer, just to defend the indefensible?”

This may be his way of trying to push the west to provide more military aid to Ukraine faster. Yet the fact that the Nato secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, publicly accepts that to end the war Ukraine will have to negotiate with Russia and decide “what kind of compromises they’re willing to do” is a clear indication that things are not going well for Ukraine.

There are several reasons for what appears to be an increasingly defeatist narrative. First is the worsening situation at the front where Ukraine lacks both manpower and equipment and ammunition to hold the line against Russia. This will not change any time soon. The new Ukrainian mobilisation law has only just been approved. It will take time to train, deploy and integrate new troops at the front.

At the same time, Russia’s economy has been resilient to western sanctions and seen growth driven by the war. On top of deliveries from Iran and North Korea dual-use technology, including electrical components and machine tools for arms manufacture, has been supplied by China.

Moscow has also managed to produce a lot of its own equipment and ammunition. Much of this is being made in facilities beyond the reach of Ukrainian weapons.

This is not to say that all is well with Russian resupplies, but they are superior to what Ukraine can manage on its own in the absence of western support.

Bleak outlook

This changing balance of capabilities to sustain the war effort, which now increasingly favours Russia, has enabled the Kremlin to adopt a strategy of grinding down Ukrainian defences along long stretches of the front, especially in Donbas in the east, where Russian pressure has been applied in recent months.

The state of the conflict in Ukraine as at April 16.
Institute for the Study of War

There is also a large concentration of Russian troops across the border from Kharkiv at the moment. Ukraine’s second-largest city has come under increased Russian attacks over the past several weeks which has led to mandatory evacuations from three districts in the region.

The approximately 100,000 to 120,000 Russian troops would not be sufficient for another successful Russian cross-border offensive, but they are enough to tie down large numbers of Ukrainian forces which, therefore, cannot be used in other potentially more vulnerable areas of the frontline.

Short of a sudden collapse of a significant part of the Ukrainian defence lines, a massive Russian advance is unlikely in the foreseeable future. But part of what Russia is trying to do right now with its broad push against Ukraine’s defences is probe for weaknesses to exploit in a larger offensive later in the spring or early in the summer.

In this context, it is important to remember Russia’s proclaimed overall goals, especially the Kremlin’s territorial claims to all four of the regions Moscow annexed in September 2022. There is no indication that these objectives have changed, and Russia’s current operations on the battlefield are consistent with this.

Capturing the remainder of the Donetsk region would be the first step and provide a basis for subsequent further gains in the Zaporizhzhia region in southern Ukraine and the Kherson region in the centre, especially retaking the city of Kherson, which Ukraine liberated in late autumn 2022.

A Ukrainian withdrawal behind better defensible positions away from the current frontline in Donbas would make the former goal – capturing all of Donbas – more achievable for Russia, but deny the Kremlin success in Zaporzhiya and Kherson. It would also frustrate any Russian hopes of capturing the remainder of the Ukrainian Black Sea coast all the way through to Odesa. Whether this Ukrainian strategy can succeed, however, will significantly depend on what kind of western support will be forthcoming and how soon.

Help wanted – right now

The most optimistic outcome is that Kyiv’s western allies rapidly increase military support for Ukraine. This must include ammunition, air defence systems, armoured vehicles and drones. At the same time, the western defence industrial base, especially in Europe, needs to switch to a similar war footing as in Russia.

‘My country needs you’: Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, pleads for more western military aid.
EPA-EFE/Piotr Nowak

On that basis, the situation along the frontlines could stabilise and whatever offensive moves Russia has planned now would not gain much new ground. This most optimistic outcome would constitute a slightly improved situation for Ukraine – any more than that is unlikely at present.

The worst case would be a collapse of parts of the frontline that would enable further Russian gains. While not necessarily likely as things stand right now, if it were to happen it would also be a major problem for morale in Ukraine.

It would empower doubters in the west to push Ukraine into negotiations at a time when it would be weak, even if almost three-quarters of Ukrainians are open to the idea of negotiations. The worst outcome therefore is not Moscow taking Kyiv, but a military defeat of Ukraine in all but name.

A major Russian offensive in the summer, if successful, would force Kyiv into a bad compromise. Beyond defeat for Ukraine, it would also mean humiliation of the west and a likely complete fracturing of the so far relatively united front of support for Kyiv, thus further empowering the Kremlin. In such a scenario, any compromises imposed by Russia on Ukraine on the back of Kremlin wins on the battlefield would probably be mere stepping stones in Putin’s unending quest to restore the Russian empire of his Soviet dreams. Läs mer…

US president, Joe Biden, and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jingping, talked on the phone this week for the first time since meeting in November. While the call signals both sides’ interest in stabilising their relationship, it also underscores the significant international, and national challenges, that Beijing and Washington face.

Xi and Biden are believed to have covered Taiwan, the possible US TikTok ban, tariffs and Chinese support for Russia, in the 105 minute call.

This phone call builds on the agreement between the two presidents at their face-to-face meeting in San Francisco last November to keep channels of communication open. It also indicates a potential return to the more frequent direct interactions of 2021 and 2022, and a slight thawing of the relationship between the two countries.

Together with an uptick of interactions among senior officials, the call is part of what appears to be a rediscovery of the art of diplomacy. Recent significant meetings include those of US national security advisor Jake Sullivan and secretary of state Antony Blinken, respectively, with the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, in Bangkok at the end of January and in Munich in February, as well as a forthcoming trip of US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen to Beijing.

Both the Chinese and US statements have emphasised the “candid and constructive” nature of the call.

The candour is obvious from the many areas of disagreement between them, from trade tariffs to the future status of Taiwan, to name but two. What is more constructive in the relationship now is that Beijing and Washington appear to be committed to leave the February 2023 weather balloon incident behind them and prioritise face-to-face over megaphone diplomacy. How far this will mend a relationship that is still characterised by deep distrust over each side’s ultimate goals, however, is not clear.

One of the biggest issues for China is the set of tariffs that the US has placed on Chinese goods, as well as US concerns about security issues linked to Chinese
technology. Donald Trump began an unprecedented trade war against China by imposing a 25% tariff on Chinese imports in 2018, when he was president. These measures, Beijing suspects, are tools the US is using to “suppress China’s trade and technology development”.

Biden, whose hands are partly tied by strong and bipartisan anti-Chinese sentiment in the US Congress, will have done little to allay Xi’s concerns, when he pointed out “that the United States will continue to take necessary actions to prevent advanced U.S. technologies from being used to undermine … national security, without unduly limiting trade and investment”. Trump, for his part, is promising to go even further if re-elected.

Flashpoint Taiwan

There is no obvious change in Washington’s Taiwan policy, but neither is there in the importance that Beijing attaches to the issue. According to the Chinese statement on the Biden-Xi phone call: “The Taiwan question is the first red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations.” Both sides’ positions will be tested in the coming months, with the inauguration of Taiwan’s new president in May.

China’s relationship with, and potential control over, Taiwan is a major disagreement point between the US and China.
Peter Hermes Furian /Alamy

Another significant factor is the strengthening of US military relations with its partners in Aukus, the tripartite security partnership between the US, Australia and the UK. The US also sees Japan and the Philipines as regional allies, who may play a part in the volatile security situation in the Taiwan Strait and the Indo-Pacific more broadly.

Common international ground?

Though undoubtedly important, the bilateral dimension is not the only aspect of the US-China relationship. Given the upending of the existing international order – first and foremost by the war in Ukraine and now by the escalating conflict across the Middle East – Washington and Beijing have a whole host of other potential flashpoints on their agenda which they will need to manage carefully.

North Korea’s increasing belligerence is clearly a concern for the US and its allies in Asia. And while China may see Pyongyang as useful leverage against military encirclement, a full-blown confrontation on the Korean peninsula is unlikely to be in China’s interest. Beijing’s more nuanced approach to the issue became apparent at the end of March when it abstained from a resolution to extend sanctions against North Korea, while Russia vetoed the US draft resolution on the issue.

Neither Washington nor Beijing are likely to be interested in yet further escalation in the Middle East. While China, together with Russia, vetoed an earlier US-sponsored resolution on a ceasefire for Gaza on March 22 2024, a subsequent vote three days later ended with China voting in favour and the US abstaining. This does not by any means indicate a convergence of interests between Washington and Beijing, but it signals that there is a bargaining space in which the two powers could find enough common ground between them to manage crises through existing international institutions like the United Nations.

Yet, there are likely limits to a more cooperative approach by Beijing and Washington to international security. This may be less about to their own desires but more about their ability to constrain allies. The recent Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus is as likely to be a test case in this regard as is Russia’s continuing aggression in Ukraine. The Biden administration has so far proven unwilling, and perhaps unable, to use its full leverage over Israel. Xi, in turn, has been unwilling to pressure Putin and is unlikely to allow Russia to be humiliated in Ukraine.

For the foreseeable future, this means that Beijing and Washington will, at best, be able to approach their shared, but not wholly overlapping interests in international security, by managing instability. If they simultaneously find a way not to let their bilateral disagreements escalate into conflict, there is every chance that this most consequential relationship will not fall victim to the Thucydides trap of an inevitable military confrontation. Läs mer…