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Air pollution has an alarming effect on global health. In 2019, it was responsible for 4.2 million global deaths. Inhaling air pollution harms health in many different ways beyond simply having effects on the lungs. Over 70% of air pollution deaths are due to cardiovascular diseases – diseases of the heart and blood vessels, such as heart attacks and strokes.

For many years, cardiovascular diseases were considered to be more of a problem of more prosperous countries, but this is not the case anymore.

In Africa cardiovascular diseases are now the second leading cause of death after respiratory infections and tuberculosis. The numbers of cardiovascular deaths are much higher in low-income countries where access to diagnosis and treatment is limited by resources available. But where does air pollution fit in?

Scientists Marvellous Adeoye, Mariachiara Di Cesare and Mark Miller explain what is known and what isn’t about air pollution and cardiovascular health in Africa.

How big is the burden of cardiovascular deaths in Africa?

While infectious diseases remain a major concern in Africa, cardiovascular disease cases are increasing, especially in urban areas. Between 1990 and 2019 cardiovascular diseases jumped from being the 6th leading cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa to the 2nd highest. The most recent figures show that in the same period the number of cardiovascular deaths in the region has increased from 650,000 to 1.2 million.

Read more:
Air pollution in fast-growing African cities presents a risk of premature death

Factors contributing to the increase in cardiovascular deaths include changes in lifestyle, a shift to living in urban settings, and a growing and increasingly older population.

An additional problem is that the region is not ready to address the increasing numbers of cardiovascular cases. Africa is experiencing a dramatic shortage of cardiovascular specialists. In 2018 the region had only around 2,000 cardiologists for the entire continent of 1.2 billion people.

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African countries need more air quality data – and sharing it unlocks its benefits

How bad is air pollution in Africa?

While air pollution is now beginning to decline at a global level, there are huge regional variations, with air quality still deteriorating in many low- and middle-income countries, including countries in Africa.

Estimates of levels of air pollution show that they are high in Africa and getting worse, especially in urban areas. Levels of air pollution are, on average, three times higher than those observed in high-income regions such as Europe. Overall, 60% of African countries experienced an increase in airborne pollution particles between 2010 and 2019.

Common sources of air pollution in Africa include vehicle emissions and industrial activities, as well as the burning of agricultural waste after harvesting. The use of solid fuels in homes like wood, charcoal and dried animal dung also releases pollutants into the atmosphere.

This mixture of air pollution can generate a range of air pollutants which can affect health in different ways. Pollutants include airborne particles of various sizes, and gases such as nitrogen dioxide, ozone, carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide.

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What’s missing?

Research in other regions of the world clearly shows that air pollution has an impact on cardiovascular health. However, the evidence from Africa is limited due to both a lack of air quality data – just 24 of the 54 African nations are set up to measure air quality in some capacity – and studies that look at the health consequences.

Our research found only six academic studies exploring the impact of air pollution on cardiovascular diseases in the region. The majority focus on urban populations in South Africa.

This makes it difficult to determine the health impact of air pollution across Africa as a whole.

Still, our review identified studies showing clear associations between several air pollutants and increased cardiovascular hospitalisations and death.

Read more:
Air pollution and temperature: bad for your heart and blood vessels

What needs to be done?

There is a critical need to expand air quality monitoring across the continent, and then to use this data to assess the links between different air pollutants and cardiovascular disease.

We need data from different countries in Africa and both urban and rural locations. This will enable policymakers to target regulations and public health interventions.

Public health education is also essential to raise awareness about lifestyle risk factors and the health impacts of air pollution. It will allow individuals to take steps to reduce their exposure and improve their cardiovascular health. Läs mer…

South Africa’s political and economic landscape shifted significantly after the 2024 national elections. The ruling ANC’s dramatic loss of support resulted in a government of national unity – a pivotal moment in the country’s political history.

It is still too early to assess the unity government’s success. But it signifies an effort by political parties to agree on the values and principles that should guide behaviour and decision-making in the national government.

The unity government presents new possibilities for South Africa. In the words of President Cyril Ramaphosa:

to work together as political parties for the good of the country, and to deliver a government that will be united in action and purpose.

However, a key question remains: will it hold? The question arises because the unity government demands that its constituent parties cooperate, even though their respective constituencies may want different things.

Certain issues will put pressure on the coalition. Consequently, the unity government raises uncertainties about the country’s political stability and direction. Particularly given the coalition’s heavy reliance on President Cyril Ramaphosa’s facilitating leadership.

As a political science researcher, I have studied South Africa’s political landscape for the past two decades, and analysed its political risk.

Here I outline eight key factors – among others – that will shape the country’s short and medium term trajectory and test the strength of its unity government.

Depth of democracy

It was necessary to form the unity government to stabilise governance. But its durability is uncertain. The coalition’s middle ground may be strained as conflicting priorities arise among its members. Key are ideological differences over National Health Insurance and conflicting foreign policy issues.

At the same time, legitimacy and confidence in governance need to be restored. Voter turnout has declined – from 89% in 1999 to 58% in 2024.

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South Africa’s unity government could see a continuation of the ANC’s political dominance – and hurt the DA

If this democracy experiment fails, it could dent the confidence of voters and business. Forming the unity government improved business confidence to “cautious optimism”.

Incumbency and succession

Divisions in the ANC continue to threaten its unity. These were highlighted at the party’s 2017 elective conference. Ramaphosa narrowly secured re-election as ANC president, exposing serious rifts within the party. These internal divisions cast uncertainty over Ramaphosa’s effective leadership of his party. His successor might affect the ANC’s future role in the unity government.

The ANC’s national elective conference in 2027 will set the party’s direction and mark the end of Ramaphosa’s leadership.

Early jostling for positions in the ANC has begun, amid ideological differences over the future of the party, the unity government and the country.

Trust in government

Public confidence in government institutions has eroded since 1994, particularly at the municipal level. Protests at the poor – or lack of – delivery of basic services, including water and sanitation, are pervasive. Violent protests reflect growing dissatisfaction.

Declining trust in parliament and other governmental bodies – starting during former president Jacob Zuma’s term (2009-2018) – is a major concern.

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South Africa’s new unity government must draw on the country’s greatest asset: its constitution

Much of the electorate feels that voting changes nothing.

It’s uncertain whether the unity government can boost public confidence and trust.

Disparities and unemployment

Stark wealth disparities and unemployment exceeding 30% add to societal tensions. Youth unemployment is even higher.

The risk of large-scale political unrest has decreased since democracy in 1994. But frustration among the poor, unemployed and marginalised still carries the risk of sporadic riots and instability.

The violent protests in July 2021, mainly in the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, are a reminder. The underlying factors for over 300 fatalities, looting and destruction stemmed from the state’s failure to address poverty.

The unity government needs to power economic growth, create jobs and reduce poverty.

Safety and security

Safety and security rank among South Africa’s most pressing issues. Crime rates remain alarmingly high, including organised crime and violence.

Trust in police is low, fuelling growth in the private security sector. There are now over 2.7 million registered private security officers and 150,000 police officers.

President Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership is key to the success of the unity government.
GCIS via Flcker

The “oldest and simplest justification” for government is to protect citizens from crime and violence.

The unity government must restore public trust in the police and enhance security.

Economic sentiment

Despite the country’s numerous challenges, the economy attracted nearly R100 billion (US$5.3 billion) in foreign direct investment inflows in 2023, equivalent to 1.4% of GDP.

Against expectations, inflows have exceeded outflows every year since the 2008/9 global financial crisis.

The country offers several advantages to foreign investors. These include world-class financial services and communication sectors, robust capital markets, quality tertiary institutions and a transparent legal framework.

Read more:
Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership style didn’t impress voters — but seeking consensus may be what South Africa’s unity government needs

It also has abundant natural resources, a strategic geographic position as a gateway to sub-Saharan Africa, and a degree of political and policy stability.

Crime remains perhaps the greatest deterrent for potential tourists. It’s also a pressing concern for business leaders.

Addressing crime must thus be among the top priorities of the unity government.

Government competence

Poor governance and a crisis of competence plague public administration, particularly at the local level. Service delivery failures, such as water provision, stem from inadequate skills and from corruption and maladministration.

State-owned enterprises also pose governance challenges. Eskom, the power utility, seems to be turning around. However, the Post Office, Transnet – the transport utility – and others exemplify systemic inefficiencies and corruption.

The July 2021 unrest underscored the state’s institutional weaknesses. The report on the riots stated that inadequate service delivery, bad living conditions, economic challenges and persistent poverty created fertile ground for unrest.

The unity government must foster a professional and effective public service that delivers tangible improvements.

Regional landscape

South Africa is not threatened by any neighbours. However, illegal migration has become a major cause for concern since the economic crisis in Zimbabwe began in the 1990s. Perceptions are growing that migrants are overwhelming the resources of the country, and take jobs from South Africans and engage in crime.

The presence of illegal miners, many from impoverished neighbouring nations, heightens social tensions.

Read more:
South Africa’s foreign policy: a unity government must be practical in a turbulent world

The jihadist conflict in Mozambique and current political instability there pose regional security concerns for South Africa.

The country was recently forced to shut its primary border crossing with Mozambique, a hub for coal and chrome exports, amid the latter’s election-related protests. Addressing these regional dynamics requires a strong foreign policy stance and robust measures to pursue peace in Mozambique. Läs mer…

When was the last time a film changed the way you saw the world? Or the way you behaved?

Miners Shot Down (2014) countered mainstream media narratives to reveal how striking mine workers were gunned down by police at Marikana in South Africa. Black Fish (2013) made US theme park SeaWorld’s stock prices plummet. And Virunga (2014) stopped the British oil company Soco International from mining in the Congolese national park from which the film takes its name.

These films were all at the centre of impact campaigns designed to move people to act. In filmmaking, “impact” may involve bringing people together around important issues. It could also lead to people changing their minds or behaviour. It might change lives or policies.

Impact is achieved not just by a film’s own power to make people aware of and care about an issue. It requires thinking strategically about how to channel that emotion into meaningful and measurable change.

Although it is a growing field, for which there are numerous funding opportunities, impact producing is seldom taught at film schools or in university film programmes. Teaching tends to be ad hoc or superficial.

As scholars who study and teach film, we wanted to know more about where and how people are learning about impact producing; the benefits of learning – and teaching – impact production; and the barriers that prevent emerging filmmakers and film students in Africa and the rest of the majority world from learning this discipline. (Also called the “global south” or the “developing world”, majority world is a term used to challenge the idea that the west is the centre of the world.)

So, for a recent article in Film Education Journal, we conducted desk research, a survey shared with the members of the Global Impact Producers Alliance and interviews with a sample of stakeholders, selected based on their knowledge of teaching impact or experience of learning about it.

We found that there are university and college courses that focus on social issue filmmaking, but hardly any that prioritise social impact distribution. Access to free in-person training is highly competitive, generally requiring a film in production. We also found that free online resources – though numerous – can be overwhelming to those new to the field. And the majority of the courses, labs and resources available have been created in the west.

We believe it is important for film students and emerging filmmakers to know at least the basics of impact producing, for a range of reasons. Film is a powerful tool that can be used to influence audience beliefs and behaviour. Students need to know how they are being influenced by the media – and also how they can use it to advance causes that make the world more just and sustainable. The skills are transferable to other story forms, which empowers students to work in different contexts, in both the commercial and independent film sectors. It can benefit a student’s career progression and future job prospects.

Existing opportunities

We found that current impact learning opportunities range in depth and accessibility.

Many webinars, masterclasses and short one-off training opportunities are freely available online. But some are not recorded: you have to be there in person. Many form part of film festivals and film market programmes, which charge registration fees.

Impact “labs” are on offer around the world. They usually run for less than a week and are offered by different organisations, often in collaboration with Doc Society (the leading proponent of impact production worldwide). Although they are almost all free of charge, the barrier to entry is high: they are aimed at filmmakers with social impact films already in the making.

We found that the postgraduate programmes (MA and PhD) most aligned with this field are offered by a health sciences university in the US, Saybrook Univerity, and are very expensive.

African content, global reach

In our journal article we presented two impact learning opportunities from the majority world as case studies. One, the Aflamuna Fellowship, is an eight-month in-person programme based in Beirut, Lebanon. It combines theoretical learning, “job shadowing” on existing impact campaigns, and in-service learning through designing and running impact campaigns for new films. This programme has proven very helpful to filmmakers approaching topics that are particularly sensitive within the Middle East and north Africa regions, such as LGBTQ+ rights.

The other, the UCT/Sunshine Cinema Film Screening Impact Facilitator short course, is based in South Africa but is hosted entirely online. It was developed by the University of Cape Town Centre for Film and Media Studies and the mobile cinema distribution NGO Sunshine Cinema and launched in 2021. We are both connected to it – one as course convenor (Maasdorp) and the other (Loader) as one of the 2023 alumni.

Self-directed learning (including learning videos, prescribed films, readings and case studies) is followed by discussions with peers in small groups and live online classes with filmmakers, movement builders and impact strategists. The final course assignment is to plan, market, host and report on a film screening and facilitate an issue-centred discussion with the audience. Topics addressed by students in these impact screenings are diverse, ranging from voter rights, to addiction, to climate change, to gender-based violence.

Both case studies offer powerful good practice models in impact education. Projects developed as part of these programmes go on to be successful examples of impact productions within the industry. The documentary Lobola, A Bride’s True Price? (2022, directed by Sihle Hlophe), for instance, got wide reaching festival acclaim, walking away with several prizes across Africa. Both programmes combine theoretical learning; discussion of case studies relevant to the local context; engagements with experienced impact workers; and application of the learning in practice.

It is clear from this study that there is a hunger for more structured impact learning opportunities globally, and for local, context specific case studies from around the world. Läs mer…

Should a US president by judged by what they achieved, or by what they failed to do?

Joe Biden’s administration is over. Though we have an extensive record, it is difficult to assess his presidency. At its outset, Biden promised hope, a return to normalcy, to be a bridge between generations, to restore democracy.

Four years on, what remains?

The Democratic Party is in disarray, its next generation of leaders unclear. Donald Trump is returning to the White House, his myrmidons clutching an extensive plan for radically recasting the United States in their image. A staunchly conservative Supreme Court has reinterpreted the powers of the presidency to expand their scope. Plutocrats are lining up to pay obeisance to the new administration, some openly speculating how to best slash the regulatory regime in their favour.

Already, Biden’s legacy seems tenuous, under threat.

Biden has been a president conscious of US presidential history, almost to the point of obsession. He did not just honour that history, but sought to stake a claim to his own place within it.

But now all that is at risk of being lost. Biden’s threatens to be a disappearing presidency, reduced to an ellipsis between the two Trump administrations, judged solely by its tragic end.

Biden himself has been reduced to an isolated and embittered old man, desperate still to serve even though the times have passed him by. His vision of America is one that no longer exists, if it ever did.

Biden’s contribution – early successes

The popular consensus is that Biden’s presidency is one of two halves.

From the period of his inauguration to the 2022 midterms, Biden accrued a substantial governing record. If his domestic accomplishments fell short of proclaimed ambitions, there was still significant progress.

Even where Biden was stymied, he could point to the normal resumption of the legislative process, the negotiation between the separate arms of government – a return to business as usual. But such confidence in the state of American democracy proved misplaced, and Biden’s reluctance to use the full power of the presidency to sway members of his own party attracted derision.

In its first half, the Biden administration successfully navigated an effective response to the COVID pandemic. It oversaw the passing of the most significant climate legislation in US history. The US$1.2 trillion (A$1.94 trillion) Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act delivered, and continues to deliver, significant material improvements to Americans’ lives.

It was not all plain sailing, of course. The chaos and confusion of the withdrawal from Afghanistan rightly drew criticism – especially the deaths of 13 US service members. While the withdrawal itself was the right decision, Biden is linked to the end of a war that dragged on for two decades, costing hundreds of thousands of lives and more than $2 trillion. It was a war that resulted, in the end, with the Taliban replacing the Taliban.

As the mid-terms approached in 2022, Biden’s presidency already seemed tenuous. Russia had invaded Ukraine in February of that year. The administration’s support for Ukraine was denied bipartisanship by MAGA radicals in Congress. The economic reverberations were significant, boosting the inflationary pressures that had already built up in the global financial system.

Predictions of a Republican “red wave” at the mid-terms were widespread. Many within the president’s party urged him to shift the messaging to core issues of inflation and economic management, in place of the less tangible emphasis on protecting democracy that Biden insisted on.

Then, in June of that year, the conservative Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade. This was a national repudiation of established abortion rights, necessitating a national response. Democrats sought to place abortion on the ballot, and though Biden was an awkward proponent of the pro-choice cause (at best), his emphasis on not repudiating established norms allowed him to present his administration as a protector of the Roe v. Wade consensus.

Once mid-term voting was complete, despite Republican gains, it was clear the anticipated red wave had not eventuated. This was read as a political victory for Biden, not just against the Republicans, but also against detractors in his own party. The President’s confidence grew, as did his own conviction in his insoluble bond with the American people.

It was the pride before the fall.

Overwhelmed by circumstance

The period from 2022–24 has proved to be one of the most difficult in history for incumbent governments across the world. The reasons for this global turmoil are not hard to identify.

The cost-of-living crisis of the past two years has stripped governments of support and authority. Economic analyses of the scale and scope of this experience have often neglected to note that the inflationary surge and rising prices have bitten so deep because they come on top of established economic hardship for wide swathes of the population.

To give him credit, Biden had long identified this trend. He was deeply concerned with the erosion of the middle class, and the need to rebuild economic security for this social layer was long at the core of his economic plans. Biden conceived this as a moral imperative for his presidency.

There is debate over whether Biden’s economic program, awkwardly dubbed “Bidenomics”, was ever suited to this task.

Despite the administration’s attempts to point out that economic figures were improving, large swathes of Americans repeatedly reported to pollsters that their lives were not better than they were when Biden took office. Considering that the US, like the rest of the world, was then gripped by a pandemic, this was a remarkable statement.

Large increases in migration numbers created an opening for the MAGA right to blame economic woes on those seeking a better life in the US. Biden and the Democrats sought to show toughness with legal restraint, alienating both left-wing supporters and right-wing detractors for whom no effort by a Democratic administration would ever be enough.

The same dynamics played out in Biden’s foreign policy. His administration provided just enough support to Ukraine to resist the Russian invasion, but with constant concern about “escalation”, criticism came that it was not enough to seriously dent Russia’s military capability. Over time aid increased, but the lingering sense remained that the administration’s response was too little, too late. Biden was accused from different quarters of doing both too little and too much to aid Ukraine’s defence.

In the Middle East, after Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7 2023, the administration declared full support for Israel, its historic ally. In this, Biden articulated the long-held position of the US foreign policy establishment.

As time progressed, accusations that the Netanyahu government was inflicting collective punishment on Gaza and its civilian population intensified. Biden sought to restrain Netanyahu’s actions, but within the bounds of ongoing and longstanding US support for Israel (including military support). On the Republican right, Biden was accused of failing to provide the support Israel required. On swathes of the left, Biden was accused of abetting Netanyahu’s administration in perpetuating war crimes.

Biden’s foreign policy increasingly looked out of step with the times, and dramatically alienated some of the core base of the Democratic Party. The world was growing more polarised; the liberal international order was fraying, if not snapped entirely. Biden’s pleas for others to respect the US’s moral leadership and to return to historic ties of fraternity did not match new and more aggressive geopolitical realities, nor the changed character of the US’s role in the world.

Trump has been quick to claim credit for the tenuous ceasefire agreement thrashed out in the final days of the Biden administration. It remains to be seen whether it will hold. And like much of Biden’s presidency, it is already being cast as too little, too late.

The state of the leaving

Biden’s decision to debate Trump early in 2024 to cement his position as the Democratic nominee for that year’s election will be derided for decades to come as one of the worst campaign decisions in US presidential history.

Biden’s languid showing spooked supporters and emboldened those who already believed the president was simply too old to defeat Trump at the polls and serve a further four years.

The president, though, sought to defy time and age, further entrenching the notion he was disconnected from reality. His 2020 promise to be a “bridge” between generations was hazy at best, but has rightly come back to be used against him.

Did his refusal to earlier confirm that his presidency would be one term affect the 2024 election result? It is impossible to tell. But Biden’s intransigence and refusal to confront the realities of time and age will be cast deep into his legacy.

Depending on how the next few years pan out, it may well be seen as his most significant contribution to US history.

What’s left behind?

Biden’s greatest ambition was to return to a state of “normalcy” that no longer existed – if it ever did.

His ambition was, in many respects, admirable – a desire to rebuild the economic base of the previous democratic order. A time when the US economy led the world (not just its tech sector) and the country built things that could be used. When secure and long-term jobs were easy to find and paid enough for people to live on in some comfort and security.

While this misty nostalgia often obscured the complicated realities of the past (and its exclusions), it was a clear and progressive aim to provide economic security to rebuild US social and democratic life.

The simple fact is that achieving this goal would require overturning long-held orthodoxies on the relative role of the market and the state in US economic and political life. In a time of economic and geopolitical stability, this would be an historic and difficult task. In our current moment, perhaps impossible.

It is easy to personalise the failings of the past four years in the person of the president. For many Americans, that is what the presidency is for. And Biden’s legacy will always be inflected with these failings.

But the state of the union is not due to the president alone.

It is the result of the cynical cultivation of racist and reactionary mobilisation by the Republican party, a process that has culminated in the person of Trump but that had proceeded for many decades prior.

It is the result of the Democratic Party’s allegiance to the established order and its processes, even when it was no longer delivering for those who most need its protection.

And it is also the failings of a president of great ambition, determined to mark his own place in history, who was too late to realise his own time had passed. Läs mer…

Over the past half-decade, the state of Texas has been pushing an evolution in the administration and enforcement of immigration law. Stepping into a traditional federal role, state lawmakers in 2023 passed Senate Bill 4, allowing Texas police to arrest those illegally crossing the border from Mexico.

But that law, which survived court challenges, is not the only place where the state has taken on traditional federal responsibilities. The Conversation’s senior politics editor, Naomi Schalit, spoke with Texas A&M professor Dan DeBree, a former Homeland Security official and Air Force veteran, about the other moves Texas has made that likely put it in a position to be a key player in carrying out immigration enforcement actions by the Trump administration.

What role has Texas taken in immigration enforcement at what levels of government?

Texas is the epicenter of the struggle between federal and state entities.

Traditionally, immigration and border security has been the role of federal law enforcement agencies, first and foremost Customs and Border Protection, which includes the Border Patrol.

Another essential federal agency is Immigration and Customs Enforcement, more commonly known as ICE. One portion of ICE – enforcement and removal operations – is responsible for conducting deportations and taking people back to their country of origin.

Customs and Border Protection is concentrated along the southern border. They cooperate closely with Texas and its Department of Public Safety.

By the nature of law enforcement, they’re generally cooperating very closely with them at all times. As an example, in a search and rescue mission, whichever agency is closest – the local sheriff’s department or state Department of Public Safety or federal Border Patrol – cooperates on a very granular level with the nearest available assets to find the missing person.

A Maverick County sheriff searches a migrant as a group of migrants of different nationalities arrive at the Mexico-U.S. border in Maverick County, Texas, on Feb. 4, 2024.
Lokman Vural Elibol/Anadolu via Getty Images

Traditionally, the Texas Department of Public Safety would not be primarily responsible for apprehending border crossers. On the border, that is purely the purview of Customs and Border Patrol. And for a long time now, the National Guard, whether it be the Texas National Guard or from other states, has had a role in border security too. The Texas National Guard is deployed within Texas.

But there’s also National Guard from around the country who, in small batches, usually are deployed to either take some of the pressure off of a state, whether it be Arizona or Texas, to help them with that mission. Those are not federal troops. They’re state troops, serving under and deployed by the governor. There are also some federal troops in a joint task force used primarily for support purposes and not deployed in the field to do apprehensions.

It’s not every border state that has its police function getting involved in border enforcement. How did that develop over the past five years?

That developed mainly because this is an unprecedented migration. So at times – both geographically and temporally – Border Patrol would be overwhelmed. They’ve got a thin green line out there – they wear green uniforms – that just can’t hold it all back. And obviously there was tension between the administration in Texas, with the Biden administration in particular.

Some of these cities on the border were quite overwhelmed. You know, I remember seeing at a conference a representative from El Paso speaking to a representative from New York City, and the person from New York City was complaining about being overwhelmed by migrants. The detective from El Paso, from the Department of Public Safety, calmly responded with his corresponding numbers, and they were just staggering for a city of that size.

And you know, in El Paso, you can say, “Hey, this is a federal responsibility to take care of this all you want.” But if, in reality, it’s not happening because the federal assets are being overwhelmed through no fault of their own, then something needs to be done, right?

So that’s basically a political conflict between the state government and the federal government over what’s not being done. And I do have sympathy for all border states, but Texas in particular, and these border areas. There is a humanitarian crisis. That’s what I call it. It’s a humanitarian crisis going on on the border – caused by an unprecedented worldwide migration – and it does need to be addressed.

Texas Tactical Border Force guardsmen arrive at the Million Air El Paso, Texas, airport on March 26, 2024, to provide extra security along El Paso’s southern border.
Brandon Bell/Getty Images

Besides the federal presence, this state involvement includes everything from the National Guard down to local police. It’s pretty much every level of government in Texas that’s involved in this?

I have a capstone research project with the Brooks County Sheriff’s Department. The immigration or humanitarian crisis on the border is overwhelming them. They have many, many, many unrecovered remains out in the desert over 942 square miles.

With few deputies patrolling that wide area, it will take generations to address that. And then, every day, particularly in the summer, they must conduct search and rescues for migrants who are in distress. There’s a steady flow of migrants through Brooks County. When they realize that they’re not going to make it they call 911, and every level of law enforcement is involved at some point or can be involved.

How do you see what Texas is doing meshing with a new federal immigration and border policy from the Trump administration?

The Texas state government will probably be lined up more closely with the new administration in their contention that there’s an invasion at the border. While I personally don’t like that term, I think there are sympathetic ears in the Trump administration to that argument, so I think that there will be cooperation or more support or funding from federal agencies.

I think, though, at the tactical level, such as the Brooks County sheriff dealing with the state Department of Public Safety and dealing with Customs and Border Patrol, I don’t think there’ll be much change.

When I was at the Department of Homeland Security, I worked for the Obama administration. Then I worked for the Trump administration, and then at the end I worked for the Biden administration. And you know, you would have thought that there would be drastic changes and big rudder movements, but there really weren’t.

The behemoth of a federal bureaucracy is pretty tough to move. Every administration comes in promising big, big changes, and in the end it usually falls short of the drastic promises.

There will be executive orders on immigration at the federal level, and we have seen the same tool used at the state level. And I understand this is part of politics. As an example, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott declared Mexican drug cartels or criminal organizations as terrorist organizations via executive order. I’m not necessarily on board with that – again, definitions are important – but sometimes words are used for emphasis or to even be inflammatory. I think we’ll see less of that from the state, because I think that the two administrations will be more aligned, so there won’t be a need for it.

My border security classes tends to result in more emotion than almost any other class I teach. When I talk to the students, I like to back up a second and go, “Whatever we think about this, it is a humanitarian crisis.”

I don’t know that it can be solved, but we have got to figure out a way to mitigate it, and what we’re doing when we mitigate a humanitarian crisis is we’re reducing human suffering. And I don’t think there’s anybody on any side of the aisle who can’t get on board with that, and that’s the way I frame it. Läs mer…

As Donald Trump prepares for his inauguration, the world is preparing for the beginning of the second Trump Revolution. Trump’s second term will be very different from his first, when his powers were more limited and restrained. In 2016 he did not win a majority of the popular vote.

Now things are different. He received more votes than his opponent. His cabinet supports his radical agenda. He has control of both houses of Congress and of the Supreme Court. Despite what some critics say, the situation is not the same as Germany in 1933. But it is a rightist revolution, nevertheless.

It is unprecedented for the US. Trump’s election threatens to dismantle the country’s liberal democratic institutions and lead to further global political instability. Trump will reverse policies and undo agreements to inhibit climate change.

One way or another, we are all going to be affected. The world we have occupied, and the things that many of us have taken for granted since the Allied victory over fascism in 1945, could be profoundly challenged.

The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.

How did the US come to elect a convicted felon accused of trying to overturn an election? And what does the new Trump era mean for the world economy? Is he simply just the latest manifestation of the 1980s neoliberal “greed is good” political motto? Or will his extreme nationalism and isolationism put him on a collision course with other world powers?

I have been an economist for five decades. My research in economics has also led me to consider the roots of authoritarianism, the limits of socialism and the crises of left-wing politics. Since 2019 I have also been involved with colleagues, including political scientist Gerhard Schnyder, on a research project looking into the growth of populism.

One question that’s vital to understanding the current situation is whether neoliberalism led to the rise of Trump. The difficulty is that the word neoliberalism has been stretched enormously in meaning, to cover many leading politicians, including Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, Tony Blair, Emanuel Macron, Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden and Trump himself. The leaders of the Hungarian, Yugoslavian, and Chinese Communist parties, who introduced more markets into their planned economies (after 1956, in the 1950s and 1980s respectively), have all been described by prominent academics as neoliberal. Seemingly, anyone who supports some markets is neoliberal.

Since the late 1970s, I have supported a mixed economy with a private sector and markets, alongside public regulation, strategic planning and a strong welfare state. Some of the prominent critiques of neoliberalism seem to reject a mixed economy. Yet mixed economies with strong welfare states are among the best performing systems in the world.

Trump’s economic protectionism contrasts with the free trade rhetoric of Reagan and Thatcher, which was inspired by influential Chicago economists such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. Instead of using an overstretched term, we should identify more specific forces and events. Here, the rise of Chicago style economics, and the election of Thatcher in 1979 and Reagan in 1980 are highly relevant.

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Hayek and Friedman revived a 19th century strand of liberalism that promoted free markets with minimal government regulation, and a reduction of the size of the state. Although their analyses differ in some important respects, they both underestimated the vital role of the state in sustaining a modern market economy.

In increasingly complex economies, more state regulation is required to make market competition work. Even from a business point of view, increasing state intervention is needed to educate and train the workforce and to reduce absences due to ill health. To serve human welfare, as well as business interests, the majority of 20th century liberals became promoters of a welfare state.

But by the late 1950s, as a curious anomaly, the Chicago school of economists had abandoned the free market policy of opposition to oligopolies and monopolies. With this major concession to the large corporations, Chicago economics inspired Thatcher, Reagan and other leading politicians around the world.

From 1980 onwards, their policies led to reductions in taxes for the rich and rising inequalities of wealth and income, as French economist Thomas Piketty and others have demonstrated. Trade union power was reduced and real wage levels began to stagnate. As Piketty has shown, more wealth and power was passed to the rich.

Globalisation created some economic insecurity. Manufacturing jobs moved to China and other countries where labour was cheaper, as deindustrialisation accelerated in the developed west. Where there was inadequate retraining in alternative skills – as in the US and the UK – the traditional working class lost out.

Corporate power started to become increasingly concentrated. And, contrary to Chicago aspirations, during the 1980s, and after, in the US and UK, there was no significant reduction in the overall burden of taxation or in the size of the state. But the rich and the large corporations have prospered. Huge companies like Amazon, Google and Walmart (founded in 1994, 1998 and 1962 respectively) now dominate the global corporate landscape.

Using some core ideas in mainstream economics, intellectual developments since the 1980s have led to an enhanced celebration of greed and self-interest over the virtues of public service and care for others. Notions of duty or public service have become unfashionable. They are excluded from many economic models, where it is typically assumed that everyone maximises their own satisfaction or utility.

Rising inequality and threats to democracy

Like all revolutionaries, Trump did not come from nowhere. The Chicago economists had promoted the virtues of private property over the survival of representative democracy. They saw the latter as a virtue, but property mattered much more. In fact, the evidence suggests that both are vital. Consider the (nominal) GDP per capita of the top 30 economies in the world, excepting smaller countries such as Hong Kong, Iceland, Luxembourg, Macau, Qatar, San Marino and Singapore. All 30 are currently democracies, except the oil-rich United Arab Emirates. All are capitalist mixed economies, but with welfare states of various sizes.

The best performers are Ireland, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the US. In seven of these countries in the full list, the welfare state is much stronger than in the US. By several criteria, social democratic welfare capitalisms, with larger public sectors and higher levels of taxation, have performed better than Anglo-American capitalism.

For prosperity, the existence of a private sector is important, but so too is democracy. Representative democracy can counter any slide toward dictatorship, help protect human rights and encourage pluralism and tolerance. There is also evidence that democracy reduces the chances of war and famine, and that it helps to put pressure on governments to deal with pollution and other environmental problems.

The proportion of the global population living in liberal democracies increased markedly in the second half of the 20th century. I am a member of the babyboom generation, born just after the end of the second world war. This generation has witnessed the forward march of democracy. In the 1970s, dictatorships fell in places like Greece, Portugal and Spain.

The 1980s and 1990s saw another surge of democratisation, with new democracies emerging in Latin America. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the cold war brought democracy to much of central and eastern Europe. But since the beginning of the 21st century, liberal democracy has been in retreat. It is now threatened in one of its first and most important homelands.

A world ripe for populism

Under Reagan and his Republican successors, the US Republican party was transformed from a pragmatic political organisation, which was capable of compromise and reaching some consensus with its opponents, to a party with an uncompromising ideology in favour of the rich.

Both Reagan and Thatcher ensured that political developments in favour of the rich were not reversed. Research shows that economic inequality can lead to a greater inequality of political power. In other words, politics reverts to an elite activity, by those and for those with money and influence.

Gordon Gekko’s ‘greed is good’ speech from Wall Street (1987).

Inequality of power leads to further economic inequality – a circular and cumulative process. It can lead to politicians being seen as out of touch with ordinary people.

In the US, the issue is compounded by how the parties are funded. The Citizens United organisation, for example, was founded in 1988 in the US to promote a deeply conservative agenda. In 2010 it won a case in the Supreme Court that ended restrictions on corporate spending in federal election campaigns. Since 2010 Citizens United has supported Trump.

The information ecosystem

Years before the political rise of Trump, the information ecosystem had already been undermined by monopoly ownership of big media, and the rise of social media as a home for conspiracy theories, misinformation, and attacks on experts.

In the past, most news and information was filtered and guided by specialists, working in accredited institutions. Science itself is an institutionalised system to screen and authenticate knowledge. Such a system is always imperfect. The new digital technologies of the 1990s raised hopes of open information systems, free and unfiltered.

But mass and social media have undermined these established mechanisms of accreditation and led to different outcomes. Even more seriously, big money and powerful political influencers have learned to manipulate the information ecosystem to their own advantage, with some experts saying this is an “industrial scale” problem.

As Walter Lippmann showed in his classic 1922 book, Public Opinion, information overload can often prompt people to adopt “cultural stereotypes” rather than evidence-based opinions. Today we now know much more about how people can select and interpret information in biased ways. For example, there is “confirmation bias”, where people seek information that confirms a belief and ignore contradictory evidence. Biases like this are profuse in echo chambers like X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook where algorithms insure users are largely exposed to information that confirms their preexisting beliefs.

There is also the “framing effect”, where the same evidence presented in different ways can lead to different responses. For example, people might react differently to a statement about a success rate (“This procedure has a 70% success rate”) compared to a failure rate (“This procedure has a 30% failure rate”), even though the information conveyed is identical.

The information explosion led by 24-hour news, smart phones and social media has greatly exacerbated these problems. These major limitations present difficulties in a democracy.

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Repeated politico-economic shocks

In recent years, the problems of dealing with information overload have become much worse. When people lose trust in experts, then they often turn to populists, who provide easy answers instead of addressing real underlying problems. We have seen this in recent years with right-wing populist governments and representatives being elected across Europe.

In the UK, right-wing politics is grappling with an ideological transformation in many ways similar to that the US Republican party has undergone. Nigel Farage’s populist party, Reform UK, has surged to 25% in the polls. And the traditional centre-right Conservatives are debating to what degree it should adopt Reform’s approach, with some arguing for an electoral pact with Farage.

But we’ve already seen the Conservatives deploy many tactics used by Trump during the last 14 years of their time in government. Condemn experts. Promote simple solutions to complex problems. Endorse prejudice. Claim to represent the will of the people. The world has become ripe for such populism.

Thumbs up for populism: former Prime Minister Boris Johnson at Downing Street in 2021.
Shutterstock/ITS

At the same time, globalisation continues to undermine job security, particularly in manufacturing, in the US and other western economies. Real wage growth has stagnated in the US for decades. There have been significant increases in US real wages since 2019, but not enough to restore confidence in government economic policies.

Confidence in government was also undermined by the Iraq invasion in 2003, led by then George W. Bush and Tony Blair, following false information that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. When no such weapons were found, trust in establishment politicians was severely damaged. Hundreds of thousands of people died in the war and subsequent instability in Iraq.

The 2008 financial crash and subsequent austerity measures led to widespread political discontent and stimulated various forms of populism. Capitalism had suffered its biggest financial crisis since the 1930s. Banks had to be bailed out and governments had to rescue financial markets. In the US, 8 million jobs were lost in two years. World trade dropped by 20%.

Markets eventually recovered, but the crash brought suffering to millions. In November 2008, Queen Elizabeth II asked a UK group of economists why they did not see the crash coming. Adequate answers were not forthcoming. All this added to a growing mistrust of politicians and scientific experts.

There is some evidence that these trends were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Inundated with misinformation on social media, large swathes of the population lost faith in the current political and economic system. Information abundance led not to enlightenment, but to a mistrust of experts, the blaming of other groups, and to a resurgence of racism and nationalism.

Trump built on these economic and political developments. He successfully courted the new billionaire elite and the owners of mass media. For many, it did not matter that President Biden’s policies had grown the US economy and greatly reduced unemployment. Many focused instead on the surge in prices, which was partly due to COVID-19 and the Ukraine war.

The rightist populist mindset was not dented by this economic success. Anti-immigration rhetoric won out. Trump made much use of the anti-immigrant card, referring to them as “stone-cold killers”, “monsters” and “vile animals”.

Historian and complexity scientist, Peter Turchin and his team have collected data on long-term political cycles, which reveal patterns and processes of decay that undermine the viability of states. They examine how and why past societies collapsed.

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Writing for The Conversation last year, Daniel Hoyer, who works alongside Turchin, said that one of the most common patterns that in the historical record was how extreme inequality shows up in nearly every case of major crisis. “When big gaps exist between the haves and have-nots, not just in material wealth but also access to positions of power, this breeds frustration, dissent and turmoil.”

“Ages of discord”, as Turchin dubbed periods of great social unrest and violence, produce some of history’s most devastating events, including the US civil war of the 1860s, the early 20th-century Russian Revolution and the Taiping rebellion against the Chinese Qing dynasty, often said to be the deadliest civil war in history.

Hoyer writes: “All of these cases saw people become frustrated at extreme wealth inequality, along with lack of inclusion in the political process. Frustration bred anger, and eventually erupted into fighting that killed millions and affected many more.”

Turchin calls this “elite overproduction”, where aspiring groups try to gain shares of concentrated wealth and power. Discontent increases, with battles between existing and new elites, vying for power. Some elites gain control of parts of the media, undermining public trust. Norms of public discourse and behaviour are undermined. States fracture internally and key public institutions decline.

Trust in government

Trump has achieved power in a country that records a low level of trust in government. This mistrust was fertile ground for misinformation and the abuse of social media in Trump’s election campaign. Although distrust in government is not the only causal factor, it is useful to look at levels of trust in other democracies for comparison.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has researched trust levels in 50 governments over 2019-23, which covers the years of the COVID-19 pandemic. The countries with the highest trust levels, expressed in percentage scores, are shown in the chart below:

They all have trust levels of 60% or above. Nine of these ten countries are in Europe. Four of them are Nordic states. All of them elect their governments by some system of proportional representation, including Ireland that uses a single transferable vote system.

Now consider the levels of trust in government in three other highly developed democracies: France has 43%, the UK 40%, and the US 31%.

Perhaps it is no coincidence that the ten countries with the highest trust in government have systems of proportional representation. By contrast, France, the UK and the US, which have much lower levels of trust in government, do not have proportional representation. France and the US are also systems where the elected presidents have substantial executive powers.

In UK constituencies the first-past-the-post electoral system creates a flip-flopping process of alternate periods of Tory and Labour government.

In France the presidential system has created movements from the right to the left and back. Although Emmanuel Macron is another centre ground politician, his main challenge in recent presidential electoral contests has been from the far right.

In the US, two parties – Democrats and Republicans – have been the only viable choices, not only for president, but for two houses of Congress, for more than a century. Since the 1960s, the system has become more polarised. Because of voting logjams in Congress, presidents have used executive orders and other powers to get things done.

Proportional systems also mean that coalitions are more likely. Coalitions do not please everyone, but they can reduce shifts to the extremes and encourage the search for consensus positions.

But research by political scientists on the effects of proportional representation versus other systems is in some respects inconclusive. And recent elections in places like Sweden, Austria and Germany show this system can help populist parties into power and prominence. So there is no perfect electoral solution, and there never has been.

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How then can populist politics be countered? The control of the media by a few super-rich moguls must certainly been seen as factor, and legislation assuring greater competition should be prioritised if we are to have well-balanced democracies.

And without restricting free expression, there must be measures to counteract fake news – fact-checkers are needed now more than ever.

Economic and political reasons for popular discontent must be tackled. Governments cannot continue to duck the problem of extreme inequalities of wealth and power. Tighter legislative controls on large corporations would encode their responsibilities to people and to the planet.

Schools also need to prepare young people for their duties as citizens, to educate them in the dangers of dictatorship, and in the need to defend a vibrant, pluralist system of representative democracy, where we have duties to others and not simply to ourselves.

What next?

So what will the next four years bring? As it was in his first term as president, Trump’s focus will be maintaining his grip on power and lucratively serving himself and the billionaire elite around him. He has already indicated plans to cut welfare programmes including Medicaid, and has said that he will abandon policies to deal with the climate crisis, which will accelerate global warming.

Trump has also announced that he will reduce the size of the federal state and has tasked Elon Musk with identifying areas to slash, promising mass job cuts. Unlike his first presidency in 2017-21, he is now facing less constraints on doing this.

Trump is no economic liberal. His reckless tariff policy reflects this. He has threatened large tariffs of between 10% and 100% on Canadian, Mexican and Chinese imports into the US. These will be imposed by his government as taxes on imports. Companies will react by raising their prices, thus raising inflation in the US. He does not believe in free trade. Neither does he appreciate the potential inflationary and other adverse economic consequences of high tariffs and a global trade war.

Talking of war, Trump has suggested that he will wind down or terminate support for Ukraine. He would placate Russia, unwary of the consequences of appeasing dictators. This raises the question of by how much is he being influenced by the Russians. The situation in the Middle East also remains volatile. There is no guarantee that Trump, having made several reckless foreign policy statements regarding Canada, Greenland, Panama and elsewhere, will be able to provide diplomatic solutions.

Trump’s plan to round up and deport millions of illegal immigrants will lead to further discord within the US itself. The US is already a deeply fractured country. These policies will greatly exacerbate internal divisions. Some US states will resist Trump by providing safe havens for immigrants.

Despite the promise of so much turmoil, so far, the stock markets have not reacted adversely. In the short term, it is possible that tax cuts for billionaires and some other Trump measures will stimulate the financial markets. But this is unlikely to last long. Cuts in the federal government could create havoc. Internal battles could undermine political and economic confidence. A global trade war would contract the global economy, leaving the US adversely affected.

The rich may gain a lot, at least for a while, and until the adverse consequences develop in magnitude. But the poor and disadvantaged will suffer. Their plight will be blamed on immigrants and the resistance within the federal and state machines. The economic and political failings will be used to justify greater authoritarianism, including limitations on free speech. We live in very dangerous times.

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Tragedies in social housing, such as the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017 and the death of toddler Awaab Ishak due to damp living conditions in 2020, remain shocking. As a coroner commented at the time, “How in the UK in 2020 does a two-year-old child die as a result of exposure to mould?”

Since then developments like Awaab’s Law have increased landlords’ accountability for delivering decent homes. However, improvements to housing stock may appear to be happening at a snail’s pace, as shown by the tower block fire in Dagenham, east London, in 2024.

But capturing data and feedback from social housing tenants is notoriously tricky. This can be due to the range of ways tenants prefer to communicate (from digital tools to landlines, physical post and in-person) as well as limited willingness to engage with authorities. This means that tenant perspectives are frequently unheard.

As customers, if we purchase a product and something is wrong, we know we have consumer rights and can have the complaint acted upon. The social housing sector is different. It has become increasingly stigmatised, resulting in areas of social housing being associated with higher crime rates, social deprivation and inequality, mental health issues and addiction.

Consequently, social housing tenants include vulnerable people on low incomes, who often experience digital inequality and less agency and control over their home environment. They rely on social housing stock availability and on landlords for the state of repair of their home.

While tenants can of course raise concerns over quality and maintenance with their housing provider, their voice has frequently gone unheard, as exemplified by the case of Awaab’s parents. But it shouldn’t be difficult to change this.

My colleague and I share a longstanding interest in social housing service performance. We wanted to understand how technology might support improvement in the sector and help guard against issues like the ones mentioned above.

Social housing is not typically associated with high technology, due to the financial constraints typical across the public sector, combined with a sometimes limited appetite for innovation. Yet the potential opportunities to use tech to improve the tenant experience appeared bountiful. Or at least, that’s what we thought.

Our research was designed to explore how tenants’ future experiences of social housing might be improved through the application of technology. We collected data from 35 experts from global tech organisations, including Amazon Web Services, as well as organisations dealing with social housing policy, senior social housing leaders (chief executives, directors or heads of service), frontline staff and tenants.

While we weren’t surprised by the broad improvement areas identified (around property standards, service delivery, integration of technology and empowerment), we did not expect that so many of the issues could be solved with low-tech (or even no-tech) solutions.

We used the Delphi method, which is a way of getting an overall picture of the future by aggregating responses from experts in different disciplines. We asked how each expert thought the “tenant of the future” might look.

In our findings, it emerged that they believed customers (that is to say, tenants) will have higher expectations in a number of areas associated with their housing.

1. Property standards

This emphasised the need for decent homes. This means social housing organisations and landlords being more aware of the quality of their properties and, in particular, paying greater attention to insulation to help with the cost of living.

2. Human-centred services

This would emphasise the importance of a contact model where tenants can raise concerns or complaints face to face through a designated housing officer. This theme also suggested that re-evaluating the core purpose of social housing would be helpful, including the role of and contribution to the wider community.

For example, respondents suggested increasing levels of community engagement by involving tenants in decision making. This would not only increase their agency, but also help to reduce stigma and stereotypes around social housing. This is an area where low or no-tech solutions are possible. One respondent said: “Whilst digital can yield massive improvements to service delivery, it should not be a replacement for … conversations with tenants, including face-to-face engagement.”

3. Making use of technology

While we expected demands in this area to be high, suggestions were in fact surprisingly modest. Respondents suggested things like online forms or live chat functions, and the use of smart devices to reduce energy consumption, detect mould or monitor things like boilers, for example.

4. Tenant empowerment

Collecting feedback allows landlords to understand tenants’ needs and work with them to develop a more customer-centred approach to social housing.

Damp and mouldy property is one of the biggest issues in social housing.
epiximages/Shutterstock

Realisation of these humble findings doesn’t feel unattainable or spectacularly unaffordable, yet history has shown us that the sector has struggled to overcome stigma and prejudice to effect change.

So what could be done? The government is moving to build new homes at speed. While this will improve availability of housing stock nationally, it won’t address issues around the quality of existing stock without substantial investment. Greater transparency around the quality of social housing is vital, alongside more robust reporting and repair processes.

While we don’t have all the answers, the importance of direct personal contact that we uncovered in our research actually feels quite heartwarming, giving the sense that tenants’ views and concerns actually matter.

Ensuring personal contact points between tenant and social housing provider should be a straightforward and affordable allocation of existing resources. This isn’t too much to ask and is definitely not rocket science. Läs mer…

Donald Trump’s return to the White House on January 20 2025 is widely seen as ushering in a period of significant upheaval for US foreign policy, and a change in the way diplomacy is done.

Trump’s favoured style of bluster and threats against foreign leaders already seems to have paid off in helping to craft a peace deal, however shaky, in Gaza. The deal was negotiated by Joe Biden and his team, in co-ordination with Trump’s incoming administration.

But analysts suggest Trump’s fierce comments on January 7 that “all hell would break lose” if the hostages weren’t soon released were actually a threat to Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu to get something done quickly. And this forced the Israeli government to commit to a deal.

Trump used this abrasive style in his first term. And his recent threats to buy Greenland, annex Canada and resume control of the Panama Canal suggest this will happen again. This may not bode well, especially for traditional allies of the US.

Not only that but Elon Musk, one of Trump’s close confidants, is openly bragging about his attempts to change governments in the UK and Germany – in an apparent move to shore up a global alliance of populist leaders.

Add to that a promised deal with Russia to end the war in Ukraine, a renewal of the maximum-pressure campaign against Iran and doubling down on confrontation with China, and you have all the ingredients of a fundamental remaking of US foreign policy.

Three particular aspects stand out and give an early indication of what the Trump doctrine of foreign policy might look like. First is the focus on the western hemisphere. Trump’s focus here appears to be simultaneously asserting US dominance in the affairs of the Americas and eliminating any perceived strategic vulnerabilities.

While Greenland, Canada and the Panama Canal have dominated the headlines, there are also implications for US relations with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, with Trump’s pick as secretary of state, Marco Rubio, being known for his hawkish approach.

Trump may inaccurately hype up China’s role in the Panama Canal, but Beijing has unquestionably increased its (mostly economic) footprint in Latin America. A Chinese-funded deep-water port in Peru has raised US security concerns. Chinese investment in Mexico has created an important backdoor into the US market, and contributed to the fact that Mexico is now the largest trade partner for the US. In 2024, Mexican exports of goods to the US stood at just under US$467 billion, compared with China’s US$401 billion.

Trump is likely to dial up the pressure in the western hemisphere using a mixture of threatening rhetoric, tariffs and political pressure. In an early demonstration of how serious the incoming administration takes the issue, his allies in Congress have already introduced a bill in the House of Representatives to “authorize the President to seek to enter into negotiations with the Kingdom of Denmark to secure the acquisition of Greenland by the United States”.

Senate hearings for Marco Rubio.

The second feature of the emerging Trump foreign policy doctrine is the scaling back of US involvement in regions the administration considers of secondary importance. The two main areas in this context are Europe and the Middle East.

Ukraine war deal

Trump’s promised deal with Russia to end the war in Ukraine is one key component of his strategy to free up US resources to focus on China and “un-unite” Russia and China.

His simultaneous insistence that US allies in Nato step up their defence spending, however, is an indication that the incoming administration continues to place value in transatlantic security. It just does not want to be the one mostly paying for it. And Trump has a point: Washington currently shoulders 68% of all Nato expenditure, compared with European members’ 28%.

Trump’s approach to the Middle East is underpinned by the same calculation of US-brokered deal-making that protects US interests while enabling a scaling down of commitments. With a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas now in place that will facilitate a release of Israeli hostages, a much clearer path to normalising relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia exists. This is still contingent upon an Israeli nod towards Palestinian statehood, but when this materialises, Israel’s relations with the rest of the Arab world will also improve.

This will then shift the burden of containing Iran to a probably more effective and capable coalition of US allies in the region, and allow Washington to resume its maximum-pressure campaign against Tehran.

What next for China?

While Trump’s approach to the western hemisphere and to Washington’s future relations with Europe and the Middle East is reasonably clear, there is an abundance of questions over his China strategy. His national security team is generally considered hawkish on Beijing – with the exception of Musk, who has significant business interests in China.

Trump himself oscillates between aggressive and conciliatory rhetoric. Alleged Chinese control of the Panama Canal is one of his justifications for seeking to reassert US control of the strategic waterway. But he also name-checked Chinese president Xi Jinping as being able to help with a Ukraine deal, and even invited him to his inauguration.

Trump may be open to a deal with China – and China, in turn, has signalled interest in this as well. While Xi will not attend the inauguration, his vice-president, Han Zheng, will.

Trump and Xi also have a track record of deal-making, even though their 2020 agreement did little more than stop an escalating trade war. That deal took two years to negotiate and left many of the tariffs imposed by Trump early in his first term in place, albeit in some cases at a reduced rate. Something similar could happen again now, with Trump fulfilling one of his campaign pledges for higher tariffs on Chinese goods while simultaneously starting negotiations on a new deal with Beijing.

In all likelihood, this is Trump’s last term as president. For the next two years, at least, he controls both the Senate and the House of Representatives. He has every incentive to make good on his promises – and faces few, if any, restraints. He sees himself as a disrupter, and his Maga base expects him to be just that. Instability is all but guaranteed.

What is not clear, though, is whether Trump’s vision of an ultimately more stable international order with clearly defined spheres of influence for the great powers of the day – the US, China and possibly Russia – will emerge, let alone whether such an outcome would be desirable. Läs mer…

Norway is set to make history by becoming the first nation to sell only zero emission (electric- or hydrogen-powered) vehicles by the end of 2025. While this doesn’t mean that fossil fuel-powered cars already on the road will suddenly disappear there, it marks a decisive shift towards their eventual obsolescence.

Imagine a world where petrol and diesel vehicles are no longer an option – a bold step towards a greener future. Norway is strikingly close to this goal.

If it succeeds, this will redefine what’s possible in the green transition. Consider this: in 2024, fully electric cars accounted for a staggering 88.9% of all new vehicle sales in Norway. Every year, this number draws nearer to the elusive 100% target (the zero emission category includes a small fraction of hydrogen-powered vehicles, most are electric).

Could Norway reach 100% by this year’s end? It’s a gripping challenge – but there is a barrier that it needs to address to achieve this. Among Norway’s top ten zero emission cars sold last year, there are no small non-SUV vehicles. Can Norway, and other countries, reach their targets selling only large cars?

Our recent research shows that affordability is a tool to get everyone on board. When lower-income households face affordability barriers, it’s not just their problem – it’s the missing link to achieving 100%. Smaller, more affordable electric cars could be the game changer needed to bridge this gap.

For every 100 cars sold in Norway, nearly 90 are electric. In Denmark, the runner-up in this global ranking, it’s just over 50. Elsewhere, few countries have reached or are even approaching a one-third market share for electric vehicles (EVs). Most of these are in Europe, with China also nearing that benchmark. The UK sits at just 19.6%, falling short of the top ten.

Why is Norway so far ahead? A mix of policies, cultural attitudes and the sheer availability of EVs play a role. But one factor stands out: subsidies. Generous, comprehensive subsidies are driving this change.

In Norway, buying an electric car isn’t just a green choice – it’s an affordable one. Subsidies and incentives bring electric car prices in line with, or below, those of petrol and diesel cars. Substantial exemptions from purchase tax and VAT, along with other perks, make electric car ownership remarkably appealing. And it’s financed not only through taxes but by Norway’s oil and gas revenue. Even with some limits on luxury models, the support remains unmatched.

Oslo, Norway is the capital of car electrification.
George Trumpeter/Shutterstock

But what about the UK? With the purchase grant – a government scheme that helped reduce the cost of buying an electric car – scrapped, the remaining modest subsidies pale in comparison to Norway’s all-encompassing support. If there’s one takeaway from Norway’s success, it’s that half-measures won’t cut it.

The challenge lies in addressing the affordability gap. Subsidies don’t always reach those who need them most. In Ireland, our research reveals a troubling trend. Grants often end up in the hands of wealthier households – those who could afford an electric car without help. Meanwhile, lower-income households, the ones who would benefit most, are left behind. The result? People buy the vehicles they can afford, which are often fossil fuel-powered.

The consequences are hard to ignore. In cities like London, low-emission zones penalise drivers of polluting vehicles. If you can’t afford an EV, you’re stuck paying more to drive or park in city centres. It’s a vicious cycle that disproportionately affects those with fewer resources.

Targets worth reaching

This isn’t just about fairness. It’s about meeting climate targets. Take Ireland, for example. To achieve its emissions goals, the country needs a significant increase in electric car adoption. Falling short means penalties for the country and missed opportunities to reduce emissions. Relying on households to shoulder the burden of the green transition is neither fair nor effective.

The UK faces similar challenges. Slow adoption rates suggest cost is a barrier. The lack of strong leadership and a roadmap to 2035 only adds to the problem. It becomes clear that more targeted support is needed.

Smaller, more affordable vehicles could play a crucial role in meeting climate targets. Even in a wealthy country like Ireland, 77% of households cannot afford medium-sized electric cars, while 38% cannot afford smaller EVs when factoring in car loans. Without price cuts or higher subsidies, larger EVs will stay out of reach and fail to drive the transition forward.

So do we even need big, luxury EVs? The trend towards larger vehicles, particularly SUVs, isn’t new – but it’s growing rapidly. In Europe, sales of electric SUVs have jumped from one-tenth to half of all EVs sold in just five years.

Larger cars are more expensive, more resource-intensive, and more wasteful. Smaller vehicles, by contrast, are lighter, require fewer materials and emit fewer harmful particles from tyre and road wear. They’re also safer for pedestrians and cyclists.

Smaller vehicles play a crucial role in clean and inclusive mobility. Achieving climate goals hinges on their adoption. Without them, meeting emissions targets – at least in Ireland – becomes far less likely. And if electric vehicles fail to deliver significant emissions reductions, their entire purpose in the transition to a greener future comes into question.

Smaller vehicles aren’t just practical; they are essential for meaningful progress. But electric cars – even the smaller ones – remain burdened by the cost pressures of private car ownership.

Ultimately, though, we also need fewer cars on our roads. A successful green transition must involve more car share schemes, improved access to public transport, and active travel such as walking and cycling.

Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?
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Donald Trump has already walked back on his claim that he would solve the Ukraine conflict within 24 hours of taking office.

Just as he once stated that he would resolve the healthcare crisis in the US easily, then backtracked to say “nobody knew that health care was so complicated”, Trump’s advisors have now admitted the war in Ukraine can’t be easily negotiated. Trump’s “art of the deal” does not really work in the real world of conflict resolution.

Trump’s original plan was to give Ukraine additional military aid to provide a deterrence against further Russian aggression. This would incentivise it coming to the negotiating table.

Another possible tactic was halting aid to Ukraine to get it to negotiate. Once “peace talks” began, Trump would urge Ukraine to capitulate territory, and create an 800-mile demilitarised buffer zone (to be guarded by Nato or European troops).

On the issue of Nato, Trump is sympathetic with Russian president Vladimir Putin’s view that Ukraine joining Nato is a threat to Russian security. So, Ukraine would have to abandon its dreams of ever joining the regional security bloc. Russia in turn would get major sanctions relief, while a portion of the proceeds from tariffs on Russian energy exports would be allocated to Ukraine.

Trump’s peace plan was engineered by incoming Russia-Ukraine special envoy Keith Kellogg (a highly decorated three-star general), who recently cancelled an upcoming trip to Kyiv. In spite of this, Trump has signalled that he wants to engage in diplomatic talks with Putin to “get the war over with”.

While the plan faces many hurdles, the biggest obstacle is that Putin does not really want to make a deal. Yes, in October Russia was losing 1,500 troops a day and the country was, and still is, struggling to recruit men. The Russian economy has had to endure a lot, with the onslaught of comprehensive sanctions while being forced to spend tens of billions of dollars on defence instead of other government services.

Yet all of this doesn’t matter because Putin is obsessed with Ukraine and total victory. Russia could even face a recession (as has been forecast in 2025) and this would still not be enough for it to agree any deal where it would have to compromise.

Donald Trump’s Ukraine plans under analysis.

Putin simply does not want Ukraine to be a sovereign nation. He either wants to destroy or control it. A weaker or non-existent Ukraine is not only a boon to Putin’s legacy as a strongman in Russia, but would be a huge blow to American global power.

Not surprisingly, Russia has already rejected these unofficial proposals from the US, even though it has yet to see an official document on the matter. Putin prefers to be a wartime president, and many Russian people are willing to live in this new normal when threatened by repression and motivated by patriotism.

Russia’s lack of compromise

Russia doesn’t think it needs to compromise. Putin knows he is far more committed to taking over Ukraine than the west is to defending it.

There are certainly signs of fatigue in Europe for supporting Ukraine indefinitely. In a YouGov poll of seven European countries (France, Italy, Spain, Germany, the UK, Sweden and Denmark), continuing support for Ukraine until Russia withdrew was found to be as low as 31% on average, compared with around 40% for encouraging a negotiated end to fighting, even if Ukraine lost territory.

There is also fatigue in the US among lawmakers and the public. So, the provision of additional weapons to Ukraine might face resistance in Congress, which is now fully controlled by the Republican party.

Support for Ukraine already faced Republican opposition in 2023, which led to huge delays. And while the Biden administration recently announced a new tranche of military aid of about US$500 million (£408 million) – part of a total of US$175 billion since the 2022 invasion – there has been waning support for maintaining aid levels to Ukraine among Republicans in Congress.

This largely reflects how the American public feels. Based on a Gallup poll taken in December 2024, there is 48% support for the US helping Ukraine reclaim the territory it has lost in the war to Russia, marking the first time this has slipped below the majority. Support for Ukraine is also very split along partisan lines, with 74% of Republicans and 30% of Democrats wanting to end the war quickly. Additionally, 67% of Republicans think the US is doing too much.

Ultimately, it is likely there will be no peace deal any time soon because Trump does not really care about Ukraine, and doesn’t understand foreign policy. Former Republican congressmen Adam Kinzinger stated recently that Trump conducted foreign policy like a “three-year old”.

Trump cares more about impressing Putin (or being seen as a deal-maker) than supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty. His vice-president, J.D. Vance, has been more direct about it, stating in 2022: “I gotta be honest with you, I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or another.” This view could have a devastating effect on willingness, and commitment, to negotiate.

According to analysis by US historian Robert Kagan, without US aid, Ukraine will lose the war within the next 12-to-18 months. Yet, for every square mile Russia gains, it loses 40 men – a heavy price to pay (Ukraine’s total area is 233,100 square miles).

The initial proclamations that Trump would resolve the Ukraine crisis in 24 hours were campaign bluster, showing little understanding of the intractability of the conflict and the challenges of setting up a new administration.

A few weeks ago, Trump stated that part of his plan “is a surprise”. The element of surprise is not just limited to the public. Maybe Trump has no idea what his next moves will be either, when it comes to ending this conflict. And that could play perfectly into Putin’s hands. Läs mer…